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Abstract. We consider a ridesharing problem where there is uncertainty
about the completion of trips from both drivers and riders. Specifically,
we study ridesharing mechanisms that aim to incentivize commuters to
reveal their valuation for trips and their probability of undertaking their
trips. Due to the interdependence created by the uncertainty on com-
muters’ valuations, we show that the Groves mechanisms are not ex-post
truthful even if there is only one commuter whose valuation depends on
the other commuters’ uncertainty of undertaking their trips. To circum-
vent this impossibility, we propose an ex-post truthful mechanism, the
best incentive we can design without sacrificing social welfare in this
setting. Our mechanism pays a commuter if she undertakes her trip,
otherwise she is penalized for not undertaking her trip. Furthermore, we
identify a sufficient and necessary condition under which our mechanism
is ex-post truthful.
1 Introduction
Ridesharing has been touted as a key mechanism to optimise transportation
systems since the 1940s. By having multiple road users share a car, it may sig-
nificantly reduce fuel costs, traffic congestion, and CO2 emissions [1]. Moreover,
a number of private ridesharing services such as Uber and Lyft have introduced
real-time online booking systems to allow consumers to book rides seamlessly.
Despite such efforts, however, the number of users of ridesharing services has
not significantly grown over the years.1 There are a number of reasons for this
but here we focus on one of the key challenges: these actors must find it more
convenient to share a ride rather than take their own car or other transports.
An important factor that affects convenience is the ability to plan trips at short
notice, but also to be able to deal with ride cancellations. Unfortunately, in
current ridesharing services, if there is a no-show of a driver or a rider, the
rider or the driver may be significantly penalized (e.g., Uber and Lyft charge a
user 5 to 10 dollars for cancelling a ride in the US). Moreover, both Uber and
1 The share of US workers commuting by ridesharing/carpooling has declined from
20.4% in 1970 to just 9.7% in 2011 (the US Census).
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Lyft operate like taxi companies with dedicated drivers and standard but low
fare rates. They indeed motivate riders to use their services, but hardly involve
many low-occupancy vehicles on the roads. Therefore, it is crucial that rideshar-
ing systems are designed to incentivize both riders and drivers to use the services
while accounting for the execution uncertainty of their trips.
To date, researchers have proposed auction-based ridesharing systems that
allow more people to participate and also shift the effort of arranging rides from
the users to the system [2,3,4]. Given people’s travel plans/preferences, these
auction-based systems automatically compute their sharing schedules and their
payments. However, these auction-based systems are vulnerable to manipula-
tions and, crucially, do not deal with the uncertainties described. Hence, in this
paper, we study auction-based ridesharing mechanisms that aim to incentivize
commuters in such dynamic and uncertain domains and seek to find mechanisms
that are robust to manipulations.
Similar execution uncertainty has been addressed in task allocation domains [5,6,7,8,9].
However, the uncertainty modelled there is agents’ ability to complete a task (i.e.,
whenever an agent is allocated a task, she will always incur the cost of executing
the task regardless of her ability to complete it). In contrast, the uncertainty
in the ridesharing context is commuters’ “willingness” rather than their ability
to undertake their trips. Hence, there is no internal cost to a rider/driver if she
does not want to undertake her trip. Moreover, there is no collaboration between
agents for completing a task, while in ridesharing commuters have to collabo-
rate to finish a shared trip. In other domains, mechanisms with verification, e.g.,
[10,11,12,13], have been designed to verify agents’ types after the execution of
their actions. However, they are not applicable in ridesharing, because a com-
muter’s uncertainty of undertaking her trip is temporal and is not verifiable from
whether she commits.
Against this background, we investigate incentive mechanisms for the rideshar-
ing domain and attempt to identify scenarios in which these mechanisms will be
robust to manipulations. We characterise such scenarios specifically in terms of
the commuters’ valuation functions (i.e., the value they attribute to rides). By
so doing, we develop a framework to study all valuation settings which, in turn,
can inform the design of ridesharing booking systems. Hence, our work advances
the state of the art in the following ways:
– We show that the Groves mechanisms are only truthful in the very special
cases: either none of the commuters’ valuation depends on the others’ prob-
ability of undertaking their trips, or the probabilities are publicly known.
– Since in general settings, it is impossible to design truthful and efficient
mechanisms, we propose an ex-post truthful and efficient mechanism where
a commuter is rewarded if she undertakes her trip, otherwise she pays the loss
she causes to the others for not undertaking her trip. Ex-post truthfulness
is the best incentive we can provide here without sacrificing social welfare.
– We then identify a sufficient and necessary condition where the proposed
mechanism is ex-post truthful. This condition covers a very rich class of
valuation settings in practice, but it does eliminate some interesting cases
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where commuters deliberately choose to not collaborate/commit under cer-
tain situations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
ridesharing model and the desirable properties of a ridesharing system. Section 3
investigates the applicability of the Groves mechanisms. Sections 4 and 5 propose
an new mechanism and identify a sufficient and necessary condition to truthfully
implement it. We conclude in Section 6.
2 The Ridesharing Model
We study a ridesharing system where there is a set of commuters each of whom
has a trip they want to make and a probability that they will eventually make
it. Each commuter is either a driver or a rider: a driver can either offer extra
seats to riders or ride with others, while a rider can only ride with others. The
trip (aka type) of each commuter i is modelled by θi = (vi, pi), where vi is i’s
valuation function for receiving/offering rides and pi ∈ [0, 1] is the probability
that i will undertake the trip (we call pi i’s probability of commitment).
Note that, a trip normally consists of departure/arrival locations, travel times,
and travel costs, which together with other travel preferences are all specified
by vi. Moreover, vi also specifies any opt out options such as public transports
for both riders and drivers. The precise format of vi depends on the context of
the application and the information available to the users. In order to cover a
full range of trip types and the ability of the ridesharing systems to cope with
them, we do not restrict the form of the valuation function, e.g., it may have
externalities. Let N be the set of all commuters, θ be the trip profile of N , θ−i
be the trip profile of N except i, and θ = (θi, θ−i). Furthermore, let p = (pi)i∈N
be the profile of the probability of commitment of N , p−i be the probability
profile of N except i, and p = (pi, p−i).
We study ridesharing mechanisms that require each commuter to report her
intended trip to the mechanism. We assume that each commuter’s trip is pri-
vately observed, i.e., they do not necessarily report their trips truthfully to the
mechanism if it is in their interest to do so. We denote θi the true trip of i and
θˆi = (vˆi, pˆi) her reported trip to the mechanism. A ridesharing mechanism con-
sists of an allocation policy pi and a payment policy x. Given the commuters’
trip report profile θˆ, the mechanism computes an allocation pi(θˆ) = {pii(θˆ)}i∈N
(i.e., ridesharing schedules) and a payment x(θˆ) = {xi(θˆ)}i∈N . pii(θˆ) = (ri, si)
where ri ∈ {drive, ride, none} is i’s role in the allocation and si is the corre-
sponding schedule for i which specifies the times, locations, and commuters
with whom i will travel together on her trip. ri = drive indicates that i will
drive and offer rides to some riders, ri = ride indicates that i will ride with
other drivers, and ri = none indicates that i is not scheduled to travel with the
others. Note that a commuter who originally drives can be allocated to ride if
that satisfies the goal of the ridesharing mechanism. xi(θˆ) ∈ R is the payment
for i. If xi(θˆ) ≥ 0, i pays xi(θˆ) to the system, otherwise i receives |xi(θˆ)| from
the system.
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Given a trip report profile θˆ, pi(θˆ) needs to be feasible with respect to the
commuters’ valuations/preferences and the consistency between their schedules.
We say pi is feasible if pi(θˆ) is feasible for all report profiles θˆ. In the rest of this
paper, only feasible allocations are considered.
Other than the basic feasibility, the main goal of the ridesharing mechanisms
is to maximize social welfare (in most cases this is equivalent to travel cost
minimization). Since the commuters’ trips are privately known, the mechanism
is only able to maximize social welfare if it can get the commuters’ true trips.
Therefore, the mechanism needs to incentivize commuters to report their trips
truthfully. Moreover, commuters should not lose when they participate in the
system, i.e., they are not forced to join the system. In the following, we formally
define these properties.
Given a ridesharing allocation, the expected social welfare is the sum of all
commuters’ valuations on the allocation. We say an allocation pi is efficient if it
maximizes the expected social welfare for any trip report profile θˆ. To simplify
notations, we separate the commuters’ probability of commitment pˆ from the
allocation pi(θˆ), and i’s valuation of the allocation pi(θˆ) is given by vˆi(pi(θˆ), pˆ).
Definition 1. Allocation pi is efficient if and only if for all trip report profiles
θˆ, we have: ∑
i∈N
vˆi(pi(θˆ), pˆ) ≥
∑
i∈N
vˆi(pi
′(θˆ), pˆ)
where pi′ is any other feasible allocation.
Note the expected social welfare calculated by the mechanism is based on
the commuters’ reported trips θˆ only. However, the commuters’ actual/realized
valuation depends on their true trip information. That is, i’s realized valuation
for allocation pi(θˆ) is vi(pi(θˆ), p) rather than vˆi(pi(θˆ), pˆ), which depends on i’s
true valuation vi and the commuters’ true probability of commitment p.
Given the commuters’ true trip profile θ, reported trip profile θˆ and mecha-
nism (pi, x), commuter i’s expected utility is quasilinear and defined as:
ui(θi, θˆ, pi, x, p) = vi(pi(θˆ), p)− xi(θˆ).
We say mechanism (pi, x) is individually rational if ui(θi, (θi, θˆ−i), pi, x, p) ≥ 0
for all i, all θ, and all θˆ−i. That is, a commuter never receives a negative expected
utility if she reports truthfully, no matter what others report. Furthermore, we
say the mechanism is truthful (aka dominant-strategy incentive-compatible) if it
always maximizes a commuter’s expected utility if she reports her trip truthfully,
i.e., reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy for all commuters.
Definition 2. Mechanism (pi, x) is truthful if and only if for all i ∈ N , all θ,
and all θˆ, we have ui(θi, (θi, θˆ−i), pi, x, p) ≥ ui(θi, (θˆi, θˆ−i), pi, x, p).
Another solution concept weaker than dominant-strategy incentive-compatible
(but still very valid) is called ex-post truthful, which requires that reporting
truthfully maximizes a commuter’s utility if everyone else also reports truthfully
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(i.e. reporting truthfully is an ex-post equilibrium). Ex-post truthful is stronger
than Bayes-Nash truthful which assumes that all agents know the correct prob-
abilistic model of the distribution on their types.
Given these properties defined in the above, we will study ridesharing mech-
anisms that are efficient, (ex-post) truthful, and individually rational.
3 The Groves Mechanisms
In this section, we analyse the applicability of the well-known set of mechanisms
called Groves mechanisms [14] in the ridesharing domain. In many domains,
the Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are efficient and truthful.
Groves mechanisms apply an efficient allocation pieff and charge each commuter
i the following:
xGrovesi (θˆ) = hi(θˆ−i)− V−i(θˆ, pi
eff ) (1)
where
– hi is a function that only depends on θˆ−i,
– V−i(θˆ, pi
eff ) =
∑
j 6=i vˆj(pi
eff (θˆ), pˆ) is the social welfare for all commuters,
excluding i, under the efficient allocation pieff (θˆ).
Since hi is independent of i’s report, we can set hi(θˆ−i) = 0, and then each
commuter will receive an amount equal to the social welfare of the other com-
muters. Thus, each commuter’s utility is the social welfare of the efficient alloca-
tion, which is maximized in domains without valuation interdependence, if the
commuter reports truthfully. However, in the ridesharing domain, commuters’
valuations are normally interdependent via their probability of commitment. In
Theorem 1, we show that as soon as there exists one commuter whose valuation
depends on the other commuters’ probability of commitment, Groves mecha-
nisms cannot even be truthfully implemented in an ex-post equilibrium. That
is, reporting truthfully is not a dominant strategy even if everyone else reports
truthfully.
Before we prove the impossibility, let’s gain some intuition from an example:
consider two commuters i, j travelling from one location to another at the same
time, and assume that only i drives and the efficient allocation is to let j ride
with i. If j’s valuation for riding with i is in the form of αj × pi where αj > 0,
then i can increase j’s valuation by reporting pˆi > pi to receive a higher utility.
We say commuter i’s valuation is external-commit-independent if it is inde-
pendent of the probability of commitment of the other commuters.
Definition 3. Valuation vi of commuter i is external-commit-independent
if for all trip profiles θ, all allocations pi, and all probability profiles p¯ = (p¯j)j∈N
where p¯j ∈ [0, 1], we have p¯i = pi implies vi(pi(θ), p¯) = vi(pi(θ), p).
Theorem 1. The Groves mechanism is not ex-post truthful if there exists j ∈ N
s.t. vj is not external-commit-independent.
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Proof. Given that j’s valuation is not external-commit-independent, there exist
a report profile θ, an allocation pi, and a probability profile p¯ = (p¯i)i∈N where
p¯i ∈ [0, 1] such that p¯j = pj and vj(pi(θ), p¯) 6= vj(pi(θ), p). Without loss of
generality assume that p¯ only differs from p in k’s probability of commitment,
i.e., p¯k 6= pk and p¯−k = p−k.
Under efficient allocation pieff , it is not hard to find a trip profile θˆ−j
such that pˆ−j = p−j and pi
eff (θj , θˆ−j) = pi(θ). We can choose θˆ−j by setting
vˆi(pi(θ), p) to a sufficiently large value for each i 6= j. Moreover, we require that
the allocation pieff (θj , θˆ−j) does not change if k reported a different probability
of commitment p¯k rather than pk, which can be achieved by setting k’s valuation
vˆk(pi(θ), p¯) to a sufficiently large value (no matter whether vˆk is external-commit-
independent).
In what follows, we show that there exist situations where commuter k is in-
centivized to misreport. Under trip profile (θj , θˆ−j), we know that k can change
j’s valuation without changing the allocation by reporting a different probability
of commitment. Regardless of the changes of the other commuters’ valuations
when k changes her probability of commitment, there always exists a situation
s.t. vj(pi(θ), p) +
∑
i∈N\{j,k} vˆi(pi(θ), p) 6= vj(pi(θ), p¯) +
∑
i∈N\{j,k} vˆi(pi(θ), p¯),
even if the valuations of all commuters except j are external-commit-independent,
i.e.,
∑
i∈N\{j,k} vˆi(pi(θ), p) =
∑
i∈N\{j,k} vˆi(pi(θ), p¯).
If vj(pi(θ), p)+
∑
i∈N\{j,k} vˆi(pi(θ), p) < vj(pi(θ), p¯)+
∑
i∈N\{j,k} vˆi(pi(θ), p¯), then
commuter k of true probability of commitment pk would report p¯k 6= pk to gain
a better utility. Otherwise, commuter k of true probability of commitment p¯k
would report pk to gain a better utility. In both situations, we assume that the
other commuters truthfully report their trips. ⊓⊔
Theorem 1 shows that the Groves mechanisms cannot be truthfully imple-
mented in an ex-post equilibrium even if there is only one commuter whose
valuation depends on the others’ probability of commitment. This is a rather
negative result as it says that Groves mechanisms are not applicable in all val-
uation settings that are interdependent via their probability of commitment.
However, Theorem 2 shows that if their uncertainty of commitment is known
by the mechanism, i.e., the interdependence of their valuations is known by the
mechanism, then reporting valuation truthfully is still a dominant strategy in
the Groves mechanisms. In some real-world applications, the commuters’ proba-
bility of commitment might be computable by the ridesharing system from, say,
their history participations/trips.
Theorem 2. The Groves mechanism is truthful if for all i ∈ N , pi is known by
the mechanism.
Proof. According to Proposition 9.27 from [16], we need to show that for all
profiles θ, for all i ∈ N :
1. xGrovesi (θ) does not depend on θi, but only on the alternative allocation
pieff (θ). That is, for all θˆi 6= θi, if pi
eff (θˆi, θ−i) = pi
eff (θ), then xGrovesi (θˆi, θ−i) =
xGrovesi (θ);
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2. i’s utility is maximized by reporting θi truthfully.
Given that pi is known by the mechanism (i.e., i does not need to report pi),
i can only change others’ valuations by changing the allocation, and therefore
xGrovesi (θ) does not depend on θi, but only on the allocation pi
eff (θ). This is
not the case when pi is privately known because, as shown in Theorem 1, i may
change the other commuters’ valuation without changing the allocation.
For each commuter i, her expected utility is vi(pi
eff (θ), p) − xGrovesi (θ) =
vi(pi
eff (θ), p) + V−i(θ, pi
eff ) − hi(θ−i), where the first two terms together are
the social welfare and hi(θ−i) is independent of θi. Since the allocation pi
eff
is efficient, so the social welfare and therefore i’s utility is maximized when i
reports truthfully. ⊓⊔
It is worth mentioning that Theorems 1 and 2 do not rely on the form of
hi in x
Groves
i . We normally set hi to be the maximum social welfare that the
others can obtain without i’s participation, which is known as the Clarke pivot
rule (the corresponding mechanism is known as VCG). The Clarke pivot rule
guarantees that all commuters’ expected utilities are non-negative, i.e., it satisfies
individual rationality, and also charges all commuters the maximum amount
without violating individual rationality.
4 Commit-Based-Pay Mechanisms
As shown in the last section, the Groves mechanisms are not applicable when the
probability of commitment is privately known by the commuters. We also showed
that this is due to the interdependence of the commuters’ valuation created by
their probability of commitment. The other reason why Groves mechanisms can-
not prevent commuters’ manipulations is that the Groves payment is calculated
according to the commuters’ reported probability of commitment rather than
their realized/true probability of commitment.
To combat this problem, one solution that has been proposed for tackling ex-
ecution uncertainty in task allocation domains is that an agent is paid according
the realized execution of her actions rather than what she reported [5]. Follow-
ing this principle, we define two payments for each commuter according to the
realized commitment of her trip: one for successfully committing to her trip and
the other for failing the commitment. The payment for successfully committing
to her trip is a kind of reward, while the one when she fails works like a penalty.
We call this kind of payment commit-based payment.
Given the commuters’ trip report profile θˆ and the efficient allocation pieff ,
the commit-based payment xcom for each commuter i is defined as:
xcomi (θˆ) =
{
hi(θˆ−i)− V
1
−i(θˆ, pi
eff ) if i commits her trip,
hi(θˆ−i)− V
0
−i(θˆ, pi
eff ) if i does not commit her trip.
(2)
where
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– hi(θˆ−i) =
∑
j∈N\{i} vˆj(pi
eff (θˆ−i), pˆ−i) is the maximum expected social wel-
fare that the other commuters can achieve without i’s participation,
– V 1−i(θˆ, pi
eff ) =
∑
j∈N\{i} vˆj(pi
eff (θˆ), (1, pˆ−i)) is the expected social welfare
of all commuters except i under the efficient allocation pieff (θˆ) when i com-
mits. V 0−i(θˆ, pi
eff ) =
∑
j∈N\{i} vˆj(pi
eff (θˆ), (0, pˆ−i)) is the corresponding so-
cial welfare when i fails to commit.
xcomi pays/rewards commuter i the social welfare increased by i if she com-
mits and charges/penalizes her the social welfare loss if she does not commit.
Theorem 3 shows that the mechanism (pieff , xcom) is truthful in an ex-post
equilibrium if all commuters’ valuation is linear in commitment (Definition 4).
Definition 4. Valuation vi of i is linear in commitment if for all trip profiles
θ, all allocations pi, and all j ∈ N , vi(pi(θ), p) = pj × vi(pi(θ), (1, p−j)) + (1 −
pj)× vi(pi(θ), (0, p−j)).
Intuitively, vi is linear in commitment if for all allocations vi is linear in the
probability of commitment of all commuters including i (see an example in Sec-
tion 5). It is evident that external-commit-independent valuations are also linear
in commitment.
Theorem 3. Mechanism (pieff , xcom) is ex-post truthful and individually ratio-
nal if for all i ∈ N , vi is linear in commitment.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we need to prove that for all i ∈ N :
1. xcomi does not depend on i’s report, but only on the alternative allocation;
2. i’s utility is maximized by reporting θi truthfully if the others report truth-
fully.
From the definition of xcomi in (2), we can see that given an allocation pi
eff (θˆ),
commuter i cannot change V 1−i(θˆ, pi
eff ) and V 0−i(θˆ, pi
eff ) without changing the
allocation. Therefore, xcomi does not depend on i’s report, but only on the alter-
native allocation.
In what follows, we show that for each commuter i, if the others report trips
truthfully, then i’s utility is maximized by reporting her trip truthfully.
Given a commuter i’s trip θi and the others’ true trip profile θ−i, assume
that i reports θˆi 6= θi. According to x
com
i , when i finally commits to her trip, i’s
utility is u1i = vi(pi
eff (θˆi, θ−i), (1, p−i)) − hi(θ−i) + V
1
−i(θ, pi
eff ) and her utility
if she fails is u0i = vi(pi
eff (θˆi, θ−i), (0, p−i)) − hi(θ−i) + V
0
−i(θ, pi
eff ). Note that
i’s expected valuation depends on her true valuation and the commuters’ true
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probability of commitment p. Therefore, i’s expected utility is:
pi × u
1
i + (1 − pi)× u
0
i =
pi × vi(pi
eff (θˆi, θ−i), (1, p−i)) (3)
+ (1− pi)× vi(pi
eff (θˆi, θ−i), (0, p−i)) (4)
+ pi
∑
j∈N\{i}
vj(pi
eff (θˆi, θ−i), (1, p−i)) (5)
+ (1− pi)
∑
j∈N\{i}
vj(pi
eff (θˆi, θ−i), (0, p−i)) (6)
− hi(θ−i).
Since all valuations are linear in commitment, the sum of (3) and (4) is equal to
vi(pi
eff (θˆi, θ−i), p), and the sum of (5) and (6) is
∑
j∈N\{i} vj(pi
eff (θˆi, θ−i), p).
Thus, the sum of (3), (4), (5) and (6) is the social welfare under allocation
pieff (θˆi, θ−i). This is maximized when i reports truthfully because pi
eff maxi-
mizes social welfare, which is not the case when θ−i is not truthfully reported.
Moreover, hi(θ−i) is independent of i’s report and is the maximum social welfare
that the others can achieve without i. Therefore, by reporting θi truthfully, i’s
utility is maximized and non-negative (i.e., individually rational). ⊓⊔
The condition of linear in commitment guarantees that (pieff , xcom) is truth-
fully implemented in an ex-post equilibrium (ex-post truthful), but not in a
dominant strategy (truthful). As shown in the task allocation domains consider-
ing execution uncertainty [5,6,7,9], ex-post truthfulness is the best we can achieve
here. It is not hard to find an example where a commuter is incentivized to mis-
report if some commuters have misreported. Ex-post truthfulness is also strongly
applicable in domains like ridesharing because computing manipulations is both
computationally hard and requiring the full knowledge of all commuters’ reports.
5 Linear in Commitment is Necessary for Truthfully
Implementing (pieff , xcom)
This section shows that linear in commitment condition is also necessary for
(pieff , xcom) to be ex-post truthful. We first demonstrate an intuitive example
showing that if the valuations of all commuters except one are linear in commit-
ment, then there exist settings where a commuter is incentivized to misreport in
(pieff , xcom). Then we further prove that for all commuters i, if vi is not linear
in commitment, then there exists a setting such that (pieff , xcom) is not ex-post
truthful.
Consider a scenario of two commuters i, j travelling on the same route at
the same time, and assume that i has a car with one extra seat to share and j
does not have a car to share with others. Therefore the only sharing allocation
is that j rides with i, if their total expected valuation is greater than what i, j
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will have when they travel alone. Assume that the valuations for i, j are defined
as follows:
vi =


αi × pi × pj if i offers a ride to j,
−∞ if i rides with j,
0 if i travels alone.
(7)
where αi ≤ 0 is a constant and represents the costs to i for offering a ride to j.
vj =


βj × pi × pj if j rides with i and pi ≥ rj ,
0 if j rides with i and pi < rj ,
−∞ if j offers a ride to i,
0 if j travels alone.
(8)
where βj ≥ 0 is a constant and represents the benefits, e.g., costs saved, that j
will receive via riding with i, and rj ∈ (0, 1] is j’s minimum requirement on her
driver’s probability of commitment. If pi < rj , j will not ride with i, i.e., j does
not want to ride with someone who is not very reliable.
It is easy to check that vi is linear in commitment, but vj is not. Assume
that pi < rj , i.e. i, j are not matched to share if they both report truthfully and
therefore their utilities are zero. We will show that i can misreport a probability
of commitment pˆi ≥ rj to gain a positive utility under (pi
eff , xcom) if αi × pi ×
pj + βj × pi × pj > 0.
Since i’s true probability of commitment cannot be verified by j or the sys-
tem from whether i commits, which is especially true if their probability of
commitment changes every time they travel. Thus, in the above example, i can
misreport pˆi ≥ rj to get matched with j, and i’s payment will be:
xcomi =
{
−βj × pj if i committed,
0 if i did not commit.
Then i’s expected utility is pi × (αi × pj + βj × pj) + (1 − pi) × 0 = αi × pi ×
pj + βj × pi× pj . If αi× pi× pj + βj × pi× pj > 0, i is incentivized to misreport
pˆi ≥ rj > pi.
The above example shows that even if only one commuter’s valuation is
not linear in commitment, there exist settings where (pieff , xcom) is not ex-post
truthful. Theorem 4 further proves that linear in commitment becomes necessary
for (pieff , xcom) to be ex-post truthful in general.
Theorem 4. If (pieff , xcom) is ex-post truthful for all trip profiles θ, then for
all i ∈ N , vi is linear in commitment.
Proof. Assume that vi is not linear in commitment, i.e., there exist θˆ−i, an
allocation pi, and some j ∈ N (without loss of generality, assume that j 6= i)
such that vi(pi(θi, θˆ−i), (pi, pˆ−i)) 6= pˆj×vi(pi(θi, θˆ−i), (1, (pi, pˆ−i)−j))+(1− pˆj)×
vi(pi(θi, θˆ−i), (0, (pi, pˆ−i)−j)). Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we can find a
profile θ−i such that p−i = pˆ−i and pi
eff (θ) = pi(θi, θˆ−i). Applying (pi
eff , xcom)
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on θ, when j finally commits to her trip, j’s utility is u1j = vj(pi
eff (θ), (1, p−j))−
hj(θ−j) + V
1
−j(θ, pi
eff ) and her utility if she fails is u0j = vj(pi
eff (θ), (0, p−j))−
hj(θ−j) + V
0
−j(θ, pi
eff ). Thus, j’s expected utility is:
pj × u
1
j + (1− pj)× u
0
j =
pj × vi(pi
eff (θ), (1, p−j)) (9)
+ (1 − pj)× vi(pi
eff (θ), (0, p−j)) (10)
+ pj
∑
k∈N\{i}
vk(pi
eff (θ), (1, p−j)) (11)
+ (1 − pj)
∑
k∈N\{i}
vk(pi
eff (θ), (0, p−j)) (12)
− hj(θ−j).
Given the non-linear in commitment assumption, (9) and (10) together can be
written as vi(pi
eff (θ), p) + δi where δi = (9) + (10) − vi(pi
eff (θ), p). Similarly
substitution can be carried out for all other commuters k ∈ N \ {i} in (11) and
(12) regardless of whether vk is linear in commitment. After this substitution,
j’s utility can be written as:
pj × u
1
j + (1− pj)× u
0
j =
∑
k∈N
vk(pi
eff (θ), p)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(13)
+
∑
k∈N
δk︸ ︷︷ ︸
(14)
−hj(θ−j).
Consider a suboptimal allocation pˆi(θ) 6= pieff (θ), if pˆi(θ) is chosen by the mech-
anism, then j’s utility can be written as:
uˆj =
∑
k∈N
vk(pˆi(θ), p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(15)
+
∑
k∈N
δˆk︸ ︷︷ ︸
(16)
−hj(θ−j).
In the above two utility representations, we know that terms (13) > (15) because
pieff is efficient, but terms (14) and (16) can be any real numbers. In what
follows, we tune the valuation of j such that the optimal allocation is switching
between pˆi(θ) and pieff (θ), and j is incentivized to misreport.
In the extreme case where all commuters except i’s valuations are linear
in commitment, we have
∑
k∈N δk = δi 6= 0 and
∑
k∈N δˆk = δˆi (possibly 0). If
δi > δˆi, we have (13)+δi > (15)+δˆi. In this case, we can increase j’s valuation for
the suboptimal allocation pˆi(θ) such that pˆi(θ) becomes optimal, i.e., (13) < (15),
but (13)+δi > (15)+ δˆi still holds. Therefore, if j’s true valuation is the one that
chooses pˆi(θ) as the optimal allocation, then j would misreport to get allocation
pieff (θ) which gives her higher utility. If δi < δˆi, then we can easily modify j’s
valuation for pˆi(θ) such that (13) + δi < (15) + δˆi but (13) > (15) still holds.
In this case, if j’s true valuation again is the one just modified, then j would
misreport to get pˆi(θ) with a better utility. ⊓⊔
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Note that Theorem 4 does not say that given a specific profile θ, all vi have
to be linear in commitment for (pieff , xcom) to be ex-post truthful. Take the
example discussed in the beginning of this section, if pi ≥ rj , then i is not incen-
tivized to misreport and (pieff , xcom) is ex-post truthful, although j’s valuation
is not linear in commitment. However, since each commuter i does not know
the others’ trips, to truthfully implement (pieff , xcom) in an ex-post equilibrium
for all possible trips of the others, Theorem 4 says that vi has to be linear in
commitment.
6 Conclusions
We have explored the issue of incentive mechanism design in a ridesharing setting
where commuters have uncertainty of completing their trips. We have shown that
the class of Groves mechanisms are hardly applicable in this setting and therefore
proposed the commit-based-pay mechanism which pays commuters according to
the realization of the commitments of their trips. We have further demonstrated
that the commit-based-pay mechanism is ex-post truthful, the best incentive we
can provide in this setting without sacrificing social welfare, if and only if the
commuters’ valuations satisfy the linear in commitment condition.
Our work also leaves several directions for future research. The linear in
commitment condition suggests that we need other solutions to offer incentives
in settings where a commuter may only share with those commuters who have
less uncertainty about their trips. Except the incentive problem, there are other
important properties of the system that have not been touched in this work, espe-
cially the proposed mechanisms might run a large deficit [15] and the scheduling
problem is computationally hard. Moreover, in real-world applications, com-
muters might not have the perfect knowledge of their travel uncertainty and we
may consider discretizing the uncertainty.
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